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THE DECEMBER MEETING
AND DEBATE
HE monthly meeting for December was held December 3, Mr. Shattuck presiding in the absence of Mr.
Toll. Those members who attended were entertained by
a spirited debate between Mr. Wayne C. Williams (for the
Affirmative) and Mr. James H. Pershing (for the Negative)
upon the subject: "Resolved: That Congress Should Enact a
Law Limiting the Power of the Federal Courts in the Use of
Injunctions in Suits Involving Labor Disputes."
It had been the intention of the speakers to debate the
Shipstead Bill, which, unfortunately, perhaps, for the clarity
of the issue, had been withdrawn upon the very day of the
meeting. Mr. Williams in opening said the debate reminded
him of the occasion when William Penn, sailing back to England, in a severe attack of nostalgia began to whistle "Home
Sweet Home". Suddenly, Penn remembered that the tune
had not yet been written, so he was forced to stop.
Each speaker was allowed fifteen minutes for his opening argument, seven minutes for rebuttal, and Mr. Williams
three minutes in which to close. We present a resume of the
arguments in the order of their presentation.
Mr. Williams: The Federal courts should be further
limited in issuing injunctions in labor disputes. No injunction was issued in this country prior to 1848. In earlier years
in England it had been a statutory crime for laborers to form
unions or to strike for higher wages. But in this country a
broader view was adopted in the first instance, and unions and
strikes were declared legal. The leading cases in the United
States are: In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, in which it was held
that a strike leader who obstructed the mails and interstate
commerce might be imprisoned; Loewe vs. Lawlor (Danbury
Hatters' case), 208 U. S. 274 and 235 U. S. 522; and Gompers
vs. Bucks Stove Co., 221 U. S. 418, cases arising upon alleged
violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which never contemplated labor strikes as restraints upon commerce; Hitchman Coal Co. vs. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229; Truax vs. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, in which Chief Justice Taft agreed that
violent picketing could be restrained, but not peaceful picket-
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ing; United Leather Workers Union vs. Herbert, 265 U. S.
457; and Bedford Stone Co. vs. Journeymen Stone Cutters'
Assn., 273 U. S. 677.
In 1914 Labor demanded an Act to give relief from injunctions. The Clayton Act was supposed to grant this relief
by prohibiting injunctions in labor disputes "unless necessary
to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property
right * * * for which injury there is no adequate remedy at
law". By the Bedford Stone Co. case and other cases, this Act
has been whittled away, so that a further Act controlling interpretation of the Clayton Act has become necessary.
In 1920 the Federal District Court in United Leather
Workers vs. Herkert enjoined illegal picketing as a violation
of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court through Chief Justice Taft held that the acts complained of were not a restraint
upon interstate commerce, and overruled the lower Court.
Yet for four years and two months the injunction had been in
force, and had illegally hindered the strikers. George Wharton Pepper declared in a recent speech that three hundred injunctions had been issued in the Railway Shopmen's strike,
and not a single one refused. The acts forbidden in this strike
included paying out strike funds, meeting upon church property to discuss the strike, asking others to strike, singing songs,
singing hymns.
The right to enjoin violence and destruction is undeniable, but rights of free speech continue, and include the right
to persuade others not to serve as "scabs". Appeals from injunctions should be more speedily determined. The right to
meet and to speak peaceably, the right of peaceful picketing,
and of paying out strike money, should be protected according
to the Act, and a jury should be required in labor cases to prevent liberty being lost without due process.
Mr. Pershing: The cases already determined put insuperable obstacles in the way of limiting equity powers of
the Federal courts by legislation without a Constitutional
amendment.
. Two other bills introduced prior to the Shipstead Bill
were abandoned because this fact was recognized by the party
offering the bill. The Shipstead Bill was an attempt to amend
Chapter 2 of the judiciary rules; namely, the rule that equity
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courts shall have equity powers where there is no remedy at
law. The Bill attempts to have property defined by the word
"tangible".
Knowing that the Bill was unconstitutional, Shipstead
withdrew it and substituted another. But underlying all of
these bills is an attempt to define property and to hold that the
right to work for another is not a property right. They urge
two propositions: first, that the right to employ and to be employed is not property; second, that there is no equity power
in the Federal courts to determine labor disputes. The real
issue is therefore, "Has Congress the right to tell the courts
how to decide labor disputes", and also "Shall this right be
asserted because equity powers have been abused by some of
the courts".
Even if these powers have been abused, which I don't
admit, the Constitution was written to establish justice. The
courts are the proper agencies for this purpose. Article III,
Section 1, declares that the judicial powers shall be vested in
the courts. The extent of these powers is that which existed
in the English court of Chancery at the time of the Revolution.
The United States Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania vs.
Wheeling Bridge Co., 13 How. 518, that original equity jurisdiction was conferred upon it by the Constitution, and in
United States vs. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, that Congress cannot
limit this power by legislation.
The Constitution gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction and gives Congress the power to limit the jurisdiction
of the lower courts. But under the color of this right, Congress cannot trespass upon the judicial power. This would
be a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Therefore, Congress by legislation cannot declare that
what has been held property is not property. And this is true
in cases involving the right to employ or to be employed, see
Adair vs. United States 208 U. S. 161, Coppage vs. Kansas,
236 U. S. 1.
Mr. Williams: If constitutionality is the issue, I am
willing to debate it. But it is not the question. The issue is
one of fundamental policy: of the right of the courts under
equity powers to deprive individuals of their liberty. There
has been great abuse; six hundred injunctions were issued last
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year. The jurisdiction of the District and Circuit Courts may
be limited by Congress, and it is in those courts that the abuse
exists. The fact is Mr. Pershing stands for property and I
stand for liberty. Liberty can't be restrained.
By the Clayton Act Congress has said no injunction shall
issue in labor disputes, unless there is no adequate legal remedy. In American Steel Foundries vs. Tri-City Council, 257
U. S. 201, 208, Chief Justice Taft held that Congress might
by legislation restrict the jurisdiction of the courts. Mr. Pershing's quarrel is therefore with Chief Justice Taft and the
Supreme Court, not with me. The court there held that unions may persuade others to strike; that a single employee is
helpless, and that unions are necessary to cope with the big
employer. If this decision is right, no court may restrain these
things; and if this is true, Congress may pass a bill to that
effect. The lower courts are restraining these things, however. Abuse exists and if Mr. Pershing doesn't like their prohibition by legislation, it is for him to suggest a remedy.
Mr. Pershing: If such a bill is unconstitutional, it is
against policy to adopt it. Every bill upon the subject has
been thrown out for that reason. I don't say that legislation
might not be proposed which is constitutional. The Constitution imposes upon the Supreme Court and such lower courts
as Congress has created judicial power. This power, once
acquired, can't be destroyed by Congress. Mr. Williams refers to a case in which Taft has declared certain acts legal.
But suppose Congress had said that Taft couldn't declare
them legal or illegal.
Mr. Williams says I am for property and he is for liberty.
But such legislation would destroy both property and liberty.
In Adair vs. United States the decision was upon the constitutionality of an Act prohibiting employers from discharging
employees under certain conditions. It was held the Act violated rights of liberty and property. So also in Coppage vs.
Kansas. Suppose there are abuses of the equity powers; it
isn't necessary to burn down the house to correct them.
Mr. Williams: I don't want the liberties of a man restricted by an ex parte injunction of which he knows nothing
until he goes to jail. I have no quarrel with Mr. Pershing
over the definition of property. He says Congress can't limit
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equity jurisdiction. Then the Clayton Act is unconstitutional
and the Supreme Court wrong. Under the Adair case and
the Coppage case no court can prevent a laborer from leaving
his employment, though his employer is thereby ruined. Yet
it has been done by injunction. The courts are not greater
than the Constitution. The Adair and Coppage cases relate
to statutes prohibiting employers from discharging men because of their union affiliations. They aren't concerned with
injunctions.
Mr. Pershing then asked Mr. Williams, "Granting the
rights involved are rights of liberty, not property, who is to
determine them, Congress or the courts"? To this Mr. Williams answered, "Primarily, Congress is to determine them".
Editor's Note.-The Clayton Act, Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, secs.
6, 20, contains the following language:
"Sec. 6. The labor -of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital
stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of
such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof;
nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof be held or construed to
be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
"Sec. 20. No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any
court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and employees, * * * or between persons employed and
persons seeking employment, involving or growing out of, a dispute concerning
terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application,
for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, * * *."

